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In Rank

Oct. 25, 1950.J

ALEXA~DRINE

VERDIER, Appellant, v. PAUL
VERDlER. Respondent.

[1] Divorce-Separate Maintenance.-A wife living separate and
apart from her husband und!'r a separation agreement anowin~
her a stipulated sum each month for her support may maintain
an action under Civ. ('.ode, ~ 137. for permanent support lind
malntenanFe upon berbushtmd's faHure to .perform. .th(U!.gr~:._
ment even though she does not attack the agreement or 8etlk
to set it aside.
(2) ld.-Separate Maintenance.-A husband's wilful breach of a
separation agreement containing provision for the wife's support may be asserted as II ground of her action for permanent
support and maintenance.
[3] ld.-Separate MaintenanC8-Pleading.-A wife living separate
and apart from her husband under an agreement must plead
such agreement in ber action for separate maintenance. and
its provisions may be relied on as a proposed measure of the
husband's duty to support.
[4] Id. - Separate Maintenance - Amount of Allowance.-In an
action for separate maintenanet', the court is not bound by the
[1 J Defenses available to husband in l'ivil suit by wife for support, note, 10 A.L.B..2d 466. See, also, 9 OalJar. 829; 17 Am.Jar.

553.
[3] Power of court to modify decree for support, alimony, or
the like, hased on agreement of parties, notes, 109 A.L.B.. 1068;
166 A.L.R. 6i5.
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Divorce, § 155; [2, 7] Divorce,
§ 154; [3] Divorce, § 158; [4] Divorce. ~ ~69; [51 Divorce, § HjS;
(6] Divorce, § 171; [8] Appeal and Error, ~ 965.

par-:!
"·4

[6]

[6]

r7]

[8]

support provisions of a separation agreement between the
ties, for by leeking a decree for her support and maintenance _l
plaintiff submits to the power of the eourt to enter a decree '~"
for a clliferent amount from that. provided by the agreement.
Id.-Separate IlaiDtenance-Decree-Ooncluaiveness and Bt·
f&Ct.-A separation agreement does not survive the entry of a
decree for separate maintenance and support and, the decl"p.e,
from the date of its entry, is the sole measure of piaintUl's
right to support.
Id.-Separate MafDteDance-JrlC)dificationof Allowance.-A
decree for separate maintenance may be thereafter modified 1
by the court whether or not a power of modification is expressly ~
reserved in the decree.
Id.-Separate Maintenance.--Relief by way of specific performance of a separation agreement would be inconsistent with
relief under Civ. Code, § 137, in that in the former ease temporary support could not be granted and the court would be
without power to vary the support provisions provided in the
contract.
.,
Appeal-Review-NecessitJ nat Matters be Considered or
Decided Below.-Election between inconsistent remedies must
be made, if at all, in the trial court and not bytbe Supreme
Court on· appeal.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the Cit."
and County of San Francisco discharging an order to show
cause why husband should not pay wife support money pend.
ing her action for maintenance. William F. Traverso, Judge.
Reversed.

.

Arthur B. Dunne, Harry S. Young, Dunne & Dunne, Young,
Hqdson & Rabinowitz, Hallinan, Macinnis & Zamloch and
William F. Cleary for Appellant.
Morgan J. Doyle and J. Joseph Sullivan for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-ln her "Col4PLA.INT FOB MAINTENANCE,
DIVISION OF COHlIUNITY PROPERTY, AND OTHER RELIEF,"

plaintiff alleges that she and defendant were married in Paris,
France, on December 27, 1918 and lived together as husband
and wife until January 10, 1937, when they separated pursuant to a separation agreement executed on that date. By the
terms of the agreement, attached to the complaint as "Exhibit 'A' ", defendant agreed "to providl' his said wife with
an income of not It'ss thal1 $500.00 a month for her support
and maintenance, and to pay said monthly sum to her on or
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before the 5th day of each month commencing with the month
of February, 1937. Said sum of $500.00 is approximately
one-half the salary now received by Paul Verdier, less payments for interest and taxes. In case his income increases, it
is understood and agreed that he will pay monthly to his
said wife in addition to the amounts hereinabove mentioned
one-half of such increase." The terms and conditions of the
agreement were fully performed until March, 1942, but after
that date, "defendant Verdier failed tlIld refused and neglected to perform the terms and conditions of said writing,
Exhibit' A' hereto, on his part to be performed and failed and
refused to pay the plaintiff the sum of $500 per month or any
greater sum on account of any increase in his income." Defendant represented to plaintiff that he was not financially
able to make further payments under the 1937 agreement and
requested a modification thereof. Plaintiff alleges that these
repr~sentations were false and fraudulent but that she was
not then aware of their falsity. In reliance on .defendant's
representations plaintiff agreed to a modification of the pro·
visions for her support by a second written agreement dated
May 11, 1946, attached to the complaint as "Exhibit 'B' ".
Plaintiff's support payments were reduced to $400.per
month and defehdant paid her $10,000 in settlement of her
('laim for accrued payments under 'the 1937 agreement. Defl'nnent thereafter performed the terms and conditions of
111(> agreement as modified through July, 1948, but "Thereaftpr. although demand was made upon him to do so, defendant
V('rdier failed, refused and neglected and still fails, refuses
1111(1 neglects to pay to plaintiff any sum whatsoever." Plaintiff's complaint was filed October 2, 1948.
Plaintiff prays for judgment that the 1946 agreement be
rescinded by reason of defendant's fraud in its procurement,
that defendant and his agents be enjoined from selling, mortJ!aJ!ing, or otherwise disposing of the community property
of plailltiff and defendant or the separate property of either
of them except pursuant to court order, that defendant be
r(>qnired to pay plaintiff $250 for expenses of plaintiff's travel
from New York t.o San Francisco to attend hearings, $1,000
pf'T month beginning August 1, 1948, for plaintiff's support
and maintenance. $1.000 for costs of prosecution of the present
action. $1.500 anditor's fees. and $11.000 counsel fet'S pendente
litp. llnn thaf "plaintiff hllvf' judlmlent herf'in again!':t defendant Paul Verdier determining the community rights of

\
\

\
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plaintiff and defendant Paul Verdier and disposing of their .l
community property and providing for the permanent support and maintenance of plaintiff and further providing that
defenqant Verdier give reasonable security for providing
said support and maintenance and making any other payments required by this Court."
C-oncurrently with the filing of her complaint, plaintitf
procured an order to show cause why defendant should not .
bf' required to pay her pendente lite relief, accompanieo by- ~
bel' affidavit that defendant had wilfully failed to provide for
her support and that" I have been, since August 1, 1948,and
now am, without funds or property, or any means of support
whatsoever." In his return thereto, defendant asserted that
by reason of the existence of the 1937 agreement the court
"is without power or jurisdiction" to require defendant to
make the requested payments. After a hearing on the order
and the return, the court concluded that it was without
jurisdiction to award pendente lit£' relief and enteted an
order discharging the order to show cause. Plaintiff appeals.
It is conceded that th£' trial court's order was not based
upon an adjudication of the merits of plaintiff's request for
pendente lite relief but solely upon ib. conclusion that it had .
------.--- -- -no jurisdiction to determine the merits thereof. (See Rob~n
SOTt v. 8upenor Court, 35 Ca1.2d 379. 383 [218 P.2d lO}.)
.
The questicJn presented by this appeal th£'refore is: Maya wife-j
living separate and apart from her husband by agr£'ement ·1
maintain an action under Civil Code, section 137·, for permanent support and maintenance upon her husband's failure .,
to perform the agreement, if she does not also attack the j.
ag-reement or seek to set it aside f
...
Tht' allegations and prayer of plaintiff's comphllnt are ,
('()lIsistent with the maintenance of such an action_ She
allege.. that defendant has wilfully failed to provide for ber

1
1

1

••• When the husband wilfully fails to provide for the wife, lIhe may,
wltbollt applying for dh'oree. maintain in the superior court an action
hl{lIillst him for permanent support and maintenance .•.• During the
p"ndpney of any such action the court may, in its Jiscretion, require
tilt· husband
to pay as alimony or as cOsts of action or B8 attorney'.
lcc~ lilly money necessary for the proseclltioo of the action and for sup1'"1'1 and maintenance.. . The court, in granting the husband or wife
,'('TInnneot support and maintenance ..• in any such action, shall make
the game dispoSition of the community property and of the homestead,
if uny B8 would have been made if the marriage had been dissolved
uy II court of competent jurisdiction_ The final judgment in such
8(-tion may be enforced by the court by such order or orders B8 • _ . it
nlll,'
del'm necessary. and 8ueh order or orders Dl81 be varied, al·
knill, 01 revoked at tLe dilicretion of the C.UIUt."

)

:1
)
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support altho~gh he "is abundantly able financially to make
payments" therefor, and she prays for judgment "providing
for the permanent support and maintenance of plaintiff"
and dividing their community property. Section 137 authorizes the court to make pendente lite awards "during the
pendency of any such action." (Warner v. Warner, S4 Cal.2d
B38, 840 [215 P.2d 20]; Baldwin v. Baldwin, 28 CaUd 406,
418 [170 P.2d 670] ; Mudd v. Mudd, 9B Cal. 320, 321 [33 P.
114J ; Loeb v. Loeb, 84 Cal.App.2d 141, 144-145 [190 P.2d
246].)
Defendant contends, however, that the present action cannot be brought under section 137 for permanent support and
maintenance for the reason that "when a husband and wife
are Jiving separate and apart by agreement, and that agreement provides for stipulated support, an action based upon
that agreement and to rescind an amendment thereto, is not
and cannot be, an action for permanent maintenance and
support, and if not for permanent maintenance and support,
the court cannot award interim relief." In his view, plaintiff
can maintain an action under section 137 only if she attacks
the 1937 agreement and seeks to set it aside. If she pleads
the existence of the agreement and does not attack its validity,
defendant contelJds that her action is necessarily an action
on the contract and not an action for permanent support and
maintenance.
An action for support and maintenance under section 137
is not barred by the existence of an unperformed separation
agreement. The allegation of such an agreement is essential
to plaintiff's cause of action under section 137. Plaintiff and
defendant are living separate and apart by agreement (Civ.
Code, § 159), and defendant is not "liable for her support
when she is living separate from him, by agreement. unless
such support is stipulated in the agreement." {Civ. Code,
§ 175.} To establish her husband's failure to provide for
her support, therefore, it was essential that plaintiff establish a continuing duty to provide support by the allegation
of an agreement in which "such support is stipulated." The
agreement preserves the husband's duty of support and prescribes the terms upon which that duty may be discharged.
It is not the agreement alone, however. but the performance
thereof that discharges that duty. (Bay District Claim Service, Ltd. v. Jones, 136 Cal.App. Supp. 789. 791 [24 P.2d 977] ;
Cram v. Cram, 116 N.C. 28R. 294 121 S.E 1971.) If the
husband has wilfully railed to perforw the agreement, an

\
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allegation of such failure is a suflicient allegation of his wilfUf' .
.failure to provide for plaintiff under section 187. .(O,.om ";,
O,.am, I'Upra. )
,i:
[1] Defendant, however, contends in effect that although,
plaintiff must alJege the 1937 agreement and its breach ~ ,;
state a cause of action under section 137, she cannot maintain .~
such an action unless she also attacks the agreement. This·.~
contention is opposed to the weight of authority. A separation'
.agreement that the husband has failed to perform is not a. bar ':
to the wife's action for separate maintenance, even though she '
does not repudiate the agreement or seek to set it aside.
.:~
eases colleeted in 10 AL.R.2d 536-540.) [2] The wilful
breach of the agreement may be asserted as a ground of the j':'>
action for permanent support and maintenance. [3] .The:
agreement must be alleged as an essential element of the wife's '.'
cause of action, but its support provisions may also be relied ,;.
upon as a proposed measure of the husband's duty ofsupport.:";
(Bradford v. Bradfo,.d, 296 Mass. 187, 189 [4 N.E.2d )005] ; "j~;
French v. F,.ench, 302 Ill. 152, 161 [134 N.E .. 33].) An attack . . . '.
upon the agreement is not a prerequisite to an action for·.~
sf'parate maintenance or for divorce. (Moogv. Moog, 203 Oal. ,:,
406, 408 [264 P. 490] ; Locke Poddon v. Locke Paddon, 194 :
~ Cal. 73, 81 [227·P. 715] ; Steinmet, v. Steinmetl, 67 Oal;:App.':
195, 198 [227 P. 713] ; French v. French, supra; B,.adford:
v. Brad/ord, supro; Oram v. Oram, 116 N.C. 288, 294 [21 S.lt .
1971; see, also, Hough v. Hough, 26 Ca1.2d 60S, 609-610, 612 ;~
060 P.2d 15]; Smitl~ v. Smith, 94 Ca1.App. 35, 47 [270 P.
4631; 166 A.L.R. 675; 109 A.L.R. 1,068.) "Even if the agreement be not void it is subject to the sanction of the court
and does not deprive the court of its power to grant temporary .:
alimony under the statutory authority therefor." (Lock,;
Paddon v. Locke Paddon, supra, 194 Cal. 73, 81; see, also,
8teinmef,v. Steinmetl, 67 Cal.App. 195, 198 [227 P. 713];
Davis v. Dow, (Ohio App.) 51 N.E.2d 288, 289; Robinson:
v. Robinson, 87 Wash. 520, 522-523 [151 P. 1128, L.R.A. 1916B:
919]; 1 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment, §§ 12.40, 13.42, .~.
pp. 440, 521.}
It is entirely appropriate, therefore, for plaintiff to rely
upon the breach of the agreement as the basis of her action
and to oll'er the' agreement as a standard or measure of her .
husband's duty of support. [4] The court is not bound by
the terms of the agreement; by. seeking a decree for her support and maintenance plaintiff submits to the power of the
court to enter a decree providing for her support upon differ-

(See

)

)
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ent terms or in a ditIerent amount from that provided by the
agreement. (Adams v. Adams, 29 Ca1.2d 621, 624-625 [177
P.2d 265); Hough 'v. Hough, 26 Ca1.2d 605, 612-613 [160
1'.2d 15); c/., Cameron v. Cameron, 85 Cal.App.2d 22, 28
(192 P.2d 89].)
[6] The agreement does not survive the entry of the
decree. From the date of its entry the decree is the sole measurI' of plaintiff's right to support... , (T]he separation agree.nent is superseded by the decree, and the obligations imposed
ore not those imposed by contract, but are those imposed by
decree, and enforceable as such.'" (Hough v. Bough. S1lpra,
609-610.) [6] The decree in such an action may be tbl'reafter modified by the trial court on a proper shuwing therefor
whpther or not a power of modification is expressly reserved in
the decree. (Monroe v. Superior Court, 28 Ca1.2d 427, 429-430
11iO P.2d 473] ; Adams v. Adams, supra, 624-625; Hough v.
JIol/(Jh, supra, 611-613.)
Nothing in the decision of this court in Patton v. Patton,
32 Ca1.2d 520 [196 P.2d 909], supports defendant's position.
Jn that case the parties had agreed to live separate and apart,
bllt the agreement did not stipulate for the support of the wife.
'l'he .agreement was a p:roperty settlement, in which, in consid('ration of the payment to-her-of a'-specifie-a sum~-the wife
waived all rights to support, maintenance, costs, or attorney's
fees in any later action. Property settlement agreements,
unlike those providing for support and maintenance, are
binding on the court if not induced by fraud or duress or in
violation of the confidential relationship of the parties. (Adams
v. Adams, supra, 29 Cal.2d 621, 624-627.) The court is not
at liberty to disregard such an agreement or to enter a decree
that modifies any of its terms. A decree incorporating such
an agreement may not thereafter be modified. (Hough v.
Hough, supra, 612, and eases cited therein.) In the Patton
ease, the wife sought to retain the benefits of the property
settlement and to secure a decree for her support and for
temporary alimony and counsel fees pendente lite inconsistent
with her express waiver thereof. Relying on Adams v. Adams,
supra, this court stated that "Under these circumstances . . .
the contract 'stood in the way . . . of any judgment for
plaintiff's support contrary to or lDconsistent with its provision, and the court eould not properly ignore its existence.' ..
(Patton v. Patton, supra, 524: RPl', also. Majors v. Majors, 70
Cal.App.2d 619, 627 [161 P.2d 494j.) In the present ease,

)"
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however, the agreement submitted to the court is one for aU~
port and maintenance. It contains no waiver of temporarf,
support or counsel fees. (See Estate of Minier, 215 Cal. 8~i,
86 f8 P.2d 123, 81 A.L.R. 689].) The court may modify of:
, reject it in entering a decree for plainti1f's permanent sup:.'
f port and maintenance.
',.
['1] Defendant contends, however, that plainti1f has elected
to stand on her rights under the 1937 agreement and to seek .
specific performance thereof, rather than to seek a 4ecree.
for her permanent support and maintenance under section .
137, If the remedy of specific performance is available"toenforce a contract made pursuant to Civil Code, section 159
(ct., Hough v. Hough, supra, 26 Cal.2d 605, 611), the terms •
of the agreement would limit the judgment that could be .'
entered. Such a judgment would be beyond the power of the •
court to modify thereafter, and plaintiff's rights would be .,
based upon the agreement and not upon the power of the '1.
court to order her husband to provide for her perman.9lt suP- .•. . .
port and maintenance under section 137. In an action on the '.
contract plaintiff would not be entitled to temporary support
or counsel fees pendente lite. Relief by way of specific per;'
formance would be inconsistent with relief under section 137
in that in the former case temporary support and counsel.
fees coulcl not be granted and the court would be without' J,
power to vary the support provisions provided in the contract.'"
In her complaint plainti1f has alleged the existence of the ~
1937 agreement and defendant's wilful breach thereof. These
allegations are consistent with either an action to enforce the ~
1937 contract as such or an action for relief under section d
137. By her prayer, however, plaintiff seeks a "judgment .•• 1
providing for the permanent support and maintenance of ~
plainti1f" in the amount of $1,000 per month, which was not 'j
. the amount specified by the contract, for counsel fees and . j
temporary support, for a division of the community property, .~
and for similar relief that is consistent only with the theo1'1-~
that the action is brought under section 137 for permanent "
tlUpport and maintenance. Although plainti1f did not wish to
attack the validity of the 1937 agreement and was willing to
have it serve as a measure for the relief under section 137,
she did not indicate that &btl wished the court to be bound by
its terms. The transcript clearly indicates that the court and
counsel. were concerned solely with the question whether it
was necessary for plaintiff to attack the 1937 agreement to
establish jurisdiction for an award of temporary IUPpon

'
1

j;.1

:1
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aud counsel fees. The decision of the court was not based upon
the conclusion that plaintiif had elected to sue on the contract
but upon the conclusion that on the allegations of her com~
plaint no other remedy was available to her. [8] If plaintiff
is in fact seeking to maintain inconsistent actions, she can
lw required to elect between them. The election, however,
must be made by plaintfif in the trial court and not by this
court on appeal.
The order is reversed and the caUSe remanded for further
proceedings in conformity with the views expressed herein.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

/

)

..

.~.

SHENK, J .-1 concur in the judgment for the following
reasons: The two parts of the agreement between the parties
are in effect but one modified agreement. In refusing to
perform the promises of the modification the defendant has
repudiated the entire agreement. His alleged conduct would
not support an inference that in refusing to comply with the
modified agreement he was willing to perform under the
agreement before modification. The plaintiif might have
elected to sue on the agreement or in equity to attack the
agreement as mddified and, as prayed, take the relief due her
in an action for separate maintenance. In the latter event she
would be entitled to the interim relief afforded by the provisions of section 137 of the Civil Code. The defendant may not
repudiate the agreement and at the same time rely upon it
as a bar to that relief. (Bradford v. Bradford, 296 Mass. 187
[4 N.E.2d 1005].) Theel~on here belongs to the plaintiif,
not to the defendant.
CARTER, J .-1 dissent.
Being convinced that great confusion and uncertainty will
result from the majority opinion, I feel constrained to call
attention to the principles of law involved in this ease with
the hope that the bar may see fit to call the same to the
at.tention of the Legislature to the end that appropriate legislation may be adopted to clarify ·what the Legislature obviously intended to be the law when it enacted section 175 of the
Civil Code. This confusion could obviously have been avoided
bad this court followed the sound legal reasoning of the trial
court and applied settled principles of law to the facts of this
ease.

There are two main questions presented in this ease:

)
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(1) Mayan action for separate maintenance be maintained ,
by the wife when she is living separate and apart from berj
husband pursuant to agreement wherein the husband agrees ..
to pay ber support money, but has defaulted in the payments,
or is her sole cause of action one on the agreement t (2) Assum.
ing sbe may maintain such an action, does she have to make an
election whether she will proceed under the statutory lia·
bility for support--separate maintenance, or under the con·
tract, and if so, when'
.. +,.-~
The answer of the majority to the first question is that she.
has both remedies. As to the record, it is not clear which
remedy she is seeking.
It would seem that as long as the contract exists the sole
remedy is on it unless we read language into section 175 of
the Civil Code. There is no doubt that the husband is liable
by law for the support of the wife. But there are exceptions
to that liability by reason of section 175 which reads: "A.
husband abandoned by his. wife is not liable for her 4upport
until she offers to return, unless she was justified, by his misconduct, in abandoning him; nor is he liable for her support
when she is living separate from him, by agreement, unless
such support is stipulated in the agreement. " That is _10--1
say no such liability exists where (1) the wife has unjustifiably .
a.bandoned her husband or (2) she is living separate from him~'
by agreement unless he agrees to support her. The reasonable
conclusion is that it is the agreement to support which is the
basis of her right where there is a separation agreement and i
the statutory liability does not exist until and unless the agreement is repudiated and rescinded, and necessarily, the only
remedy for a breach of the agreement is an action on the
contract. It is said in 7 So.Cal.L.Rev. 342, 343: "It would
seem that if the husband defaults on the agreement by fail·
ing to pay the monthly allowance, the wife's remedy should
be on the agreement. She may, and did in the instant case,
secure a judgment against the husband for the amount in
default. Since her right to support is derived from the agree.
ment (§ 175) she should not be able to resort to the common
law obligation but should be required to pursue her remedy
on the agreement." At most, the right cannot shift to the
statutory duty until the contract ceases to exist. That might
occur by mutual rescission, reconciliation or offer thereof, or
by a complete repudiation of it by the husband, accepted by
the wife as an abandonment of the contract. Certainly a mere
failure to pay a few monthly iru;tullruellts is not a repudiation.

251
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That there must be an abandonment of the agreement by the
wife before an action for separate maintenance lies is evident
from the fact, that as long as the contract is in force, she is
Ih'ing apart from her husband with his consent and is thus
lIot entitled to support under section 175. It is said in London
n. d' A. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 181 Cal. 460, 466 [184 P.
hG-lj, in stating that an interlocutory judgment of divorce
with no provision for support is like a contract to live apart l
"The judgment has the effect of a contract for that purpose.
Until that contract is in some manner changed, either in the
action or in some independent proceeding, or by a reconciliation, her right to support is suspended." (Emphasis added.)
The court stated in Lloyd Corp. Ltd. v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
61 Cal.App.2d 275, 279 [142 P.2d 754]: "A husband's obli·
~atil)n of support is suspended while his wife is living separate
from him by agreement (Civ. Code, § 175), but the resumption of marital relations, following a reconciliation, cancels
the executory obligations of separation agreements." (Emphasis added.) If it is suspended when there is an agreement, it
stays suspended as long as there is such an agreement. The
wife cannot say yes there is an agreement but my husband
has failed to ID.(lke-some ·payments-tbereunder -and thusl
am entitled to separate maintenance, for by standing on the
agreement she is necessarily consenting to live .separate and
apart, and thus, is not entitled to support under section 175.
She cannot insist that part of the agreement be in force and
the remainder not. It makes no difference whether she has
grounds other than failure to provide for separate maintenance, she still has no right to support until she ceases to live
separate with his consent or unless she is justified by her husband's conduct. Under any other view, a separate maintenance
action is being used as merely an auxiliary remedy to enforce
the agreement for support. But that. cannot be done because
it is conceded that such an action cannot be maintained as
long as the husband performs.
It follows that an essential part of plaintiff's action for
separate maintenance is missing, namely, that defendant has
repudiated the separation agreement and plaintiff accepts
such repudiation. Plaintiff makes no contention that the
1937 contract has been terminated. Such being the case, her
only action is on the contract. This the plaintiff has not done.
She took no stand on the matter in her complaint, in the triaJ
court, or here, although pressed to do so.

)
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The majority opinion entirely disregards the baaie princC,'
pIe of law codified in section 175 of the Civil Code. Thatprinciple may be stated as follows: If the husband and wifl'/,
are living separate and apart by agreement, the husband is ;;';
not liable for her support unless the agreement 10 prcmdea: .
in which event, he is liable for the amount specified in tht"
agreement. His failure to perform the agreement would Jive'
her the right to sue him for any amount due her thereunder."
It may be that his failure to perform is not wilful, aDd thar;
both parties desire that the agreement continue in forea. Cer._;
tainly, when the agreement is pleaded, and its validiV is not ",
challenged, its provisions should be the IOle basis for deter·
mining the relief to which plaintiff is entitled. Otherwise,
such an agreement would be nothing more than a scrap of
paper and no reputable lawyer would advise a husband to ,;
execute one. Those who have had experience in the settle-1
ment of domestic problems for clients know that usually many",
matters other than the payment of support money are em· -:
bodied in such agreements, and that to permit a wife to repu·
diate the entire agreement and sue for separate maintenancel
in disregard of its provisions, without restoring the benefit~s,;
she had received, thereunder, would place her in a position ;;,
-10 take an unfair advantage by obtaining allowances to whieh
she would not be entitled under the agreement which RhPj
concedes to be valid and bindin/r upon her.-.;~i
It seems clear to me that the rule should be that when 11II :4
agreement is pleaded, and its validity is not attacked, thp 'j
relief to which the parties are entitled must be limited to itK "~
provisions, and that this should be the rule even though an 1
attempt is made to scramble a cause of action for separate
maintenance into the same complaint or cause of action in
which the agreement is pleaded.
In the ease before us, the 1937 agreement was the basic i
agreement between the parties. It provided, among other
things, for plaintiff's support and maintenance while living
separate and apart from defendant. It made no provision ,
for payment by defendant of any of the items which plaintiff
asked the court to allow her in her application here involved.
She claimed that the modification of this agreement which she
I!xecuted in 1946 was procured by fraud, and is therefore
invalid. She asks to have this modification set aside, but
she makes no offer to restore the benefits she received pursuant
to its provisions. Assuming that she may have thE" right to
rescind the 1946 agreement, she is not attacking the 193i
I
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agfeement and the relief to which she is entitled must be 1
determined by the provisions of the latter agreement if any .
etrect whatever is given to section 175 of the Civil Code.
The majority opinion correctly states the problem involved
h('rein as follows: "The question presented by this appeal
I herefore is: May a wife living separate and apart from her
II II shand by agreement maintain an action under Civil Code,
~('ction 137, for permanent support and maintenance upon
lIer husband's failure to perform the agreement, if she does
lIot also attack the agreement or seek to tiet it aside'"
Said opinion then states: "To establish her husband's failnre to provide for her support, therefore. it was essential that
plaintiff establish a continuing duty to provide support by
the allegation of an agreement in which 'flUcb support is
st ipulated.' The agreement preserves the husband's duty of
l'Upport and prescribes the terms upon which that duty may
he discharged. . . .
"If the remedy of specific performance is available to enforre a contract made pursuant to Civil Code, section 159
(r.t., Hough v. Hough, supra. 26 Cal.2d 605,611), the terms
of the agreement would limit the judgment that could be
entered. Such a judgment would be beyond the power of
tIle court to modify thereafter. and plaintiff's rights would
be based upon the agreement and not upon the power of the
~onrt to order her husband to provide for her permanent
RUpport and maintenance under section 137. In an action
on the contract plaintiff would not be entitled to temporary
support or counsel fees pendente lite. Relief by way of
specific performance would be inconsistent with relief under
R('ction 137 in that in the formpT callI' temporary support and
ronnllel fees could not be I?ranten lind the court would be
without power to vary the support provisions provided in
thl' ron tract. "
The majority opinion condudes with the following stlltement: "Although plaintiff dil", not wish to attack the validity
of t}1e 1937 agreement and wa!> willing to havt' it serve ag a
measure for the relief under section 137, she did not indicate
that she wished the court to be bound by its terms. The
transcript clearly indicates that the court and counsel were
('oncerned solely with the question whether it was necessary
for plaintiff to attack the 1937 agreement to establish juris.
ilietion for an award of temporary ~UPP()rt Rni! P01lnllel fpes.
'PhI' rlcr;!I;on of thl' C'011Tt was not ba!len llnon the conplu!lion
t"at plaintiff had elected to sue on the contract but upon the
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conclusion that on the allegations of her complaint no other"
remedy was avaiJablf> to hpT. If plaintiff is in fact seeking to:
maintain ineon~i!;tent a('tinns, she can be required to elect:
between them. The ekction. howf>ver, must be madf> by plain~'"
tiff in the trial court and not by this ('onrt on appeal."
AA I analyzf> thf> majorit; opinion. it holds that if #\ valid·'
contract exists bf>twf>en plaintiff and defendant she is bound .
by its terms. and th(> court wOllld have no power to make aD;
award to her granting her Tplief not provided for in the ':,
agrpf>mf>nt. but sincp shf> (lid not state in so many words that·
Ah~ was standing on thf> agreement. but merely pleaded it for
thp purposp of Pf'tabliAhinf,r defendant's obligation to her for
support and maintenance and then asked for additional relief
in thf> way of allowances not covered by the agreement, the
court was powerless to do anything except consider her appli('ation for the additional al10wances and render a decision on
the merits to her application for such allowances. Such proce-.
dure, in my opinion, would amonnt to trifling with the court
by permitting a plaintiff to blow hot and blow cold, depending
upon the particular mood she was in at the time she presented ;
her application. A more ('ommon sense view would seem to ,
be that when she pleaded thp agreement and did not attack its :
validity. she thereupon madf> an election to stand on it,
thf> relief to which shp waA plltitled would have to be limited by,
its provisions. Sin<'p thp majority opinion bolds that if there
is a valid and binding agrppment pxiAting betwt'en the parties '
"thp court would bp withont rower to vary tht' support
provisions providffi in thp <'ontract." why should not the
trill 1 conrt be pprmittpd to rPfJnlrp plaintiff to take a position,
AA it did in this case. and !lhp having refused to repudiate
the contract, I'onclndp that shE' wa~ bound thereby and deny'
ber any relief otbpr than that provided for in the contract!
I respectfully submit that thp majority opinion does not
contain a satisfactory IIn~wpr to this question.
The out-of-state cases cited in the majority opinion are
of no persuasive authority in thi!! Rtate. fOT the reason tbat it .
does not appear tbat in auy of those states was there a statute
in any respect comparable to section 17!'> of our Civil Code,
•
which is controlling here.
On the subject of election. this court held in the very recent'
'case of Steiner v. Rowley, 35 Cal.2d 7] 3 f22] P.2d 9], tbat 8
'plaiutiff made an election between II tort and contract action
by the mere isslIance of an attachment. Such bolding- was
made notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision 3 of see-
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tion 537 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that an attachment
may be issued in a tort action where the defendant is a nonr('sident of the state. It seems to me that such holding goes
much farther than it is necessary to go in this case to hold
that when plaintiff pleaded the 1937 agreement without att.ucking its validity, she thereby made an election to stand
on snch agreement and that the relief to which she was entitled should be limited by its provisions.
It, therefore, seems clear to me that if plaintiff is seeking
to enforce the 1937 agreement, 5hf' is not entitled to support
pcndente lite, traveling expense, support and maintenance,
(,OAtA, and attorney's fees.
(Lindey, Separation Agreements,
§ 26. p. 425.) If she is seeking to set aside both the 1937 and
1946 contracts, and suing for separate maintenance and support, she would be, in the discretion of the court, entitlf'd to
such relief (Civ. Code, § 137), pending the determination of
the validity of the contracts. (Patton v. Patton, 32 Cal.2d
520 [196 P.2d 909J.) A note in 7 So.Cal.L.Rev .. 342. 343,
states that it would seem that if the husband defaults on
the agreement by failinjZ to pay the monthly allowance, tke
wife's remedy ~hould be on tke agreement. If she is suing
to enforce the 1937 agreement. it would seem that her rights
are limited by that a~reementl althongtito do so she must 'have
the ]946 amendment set aside.
Whf'n the two sections (137 and ]75 of the Civil Cod(') are
read together it would appear that where the wife is IivinjZ
!;('parate and apart from her husband by agreement. she has
no eause of action for wilfnl failure to provide ;f the a~ee
lI1('nt doe!; not provide for hl'r snpport: if the a~r('ement do(>S
provide for her snpport. then her remedy j!; limited to the
f'nforcement of the provisiom. thereof. Plaintiff. thE'refore.
may not seek to enfor('e the ajZreement and. at th(' same time.
state a cause of action for separat(> maintenanc(> nnder section
137 of the Civil Code and pra~' for support p(>nfif'nte lite, etc.
"Where the husband breach(>!; the agreem(>nt. the wife can
stand on her matrimonial rights ani! su(' for alimony and
conns(>l f(>(>s, or stand on her contract rights a~ any person
Who has madf' a contra!'t with another. and for(>go the advanta~es of the matrimonial relation. She cannot do both; she
must eJe!'t becallse the r(>medips arE' inconsistent.
"As a rul(> the election will be spE'llE'iI 011t from the course
adopted by the wife. If she sues for spparation, Rhe is deemed
to have rescinded the separation agreement ani! may not
later recover thereon ••• Conversely, if she sues for monthly
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payments under the contract, she elects to affirm it, and
the right to repudiate it and ask for alimony and counsel fees.
But a subsequent breach will revive her right of election.
• C In view of the inconsistency already pointed out, it is
that the wife cannot in one action sue for separate maintenance
and for payments due under a separation agreement, nor can
sht> maintain two separate concurrent actions for the same
purposes." (Lindey, Separation Agreements, 1937, § 16,
pp. 318, 321, and cases cited there.)
It would seem that plaintiff wife is here attempting 10___
pursue, in one cause of action, two inconsistent remedies.
(10 Cal.Jur., p. 1; 5 Cal.Jur., lO.Yr.Supp., p. 412, and eases
cited.)
At the hearing in the trial court, it was admitted by plain.
tiff's attorney several times that his client was seeking to
enforct> the 1937 agreement. This admission would seem to
preclude the court from granting the interim relief sought
since it appears that this is not a case where the plainti1l
is seeking to set aside a contract and sue for alimony or for
separate maintenance and allowance for costs and attorneys')
fees. She appears to se.ek relief based SOlelY. on th.e 1937.. con· .'
tract. From the foregoing, it should be clear that the 1937
i 1!ontract stands in the way of any order"1:or·p1aintitf's·suppOft
. contrary to or inconsistent with its provisions and that the.
court, properly, did not ignore its existence. (patton--\'~
Patton, 32. Cal.2d 520, 524 [196 P.2d 909] ; Major. v. Major.,
70 Cal.App.2d 619 [161 P.2d 494] ; Lindey, Separation Agreements, supra.)
I would, therefore, affirm the order of the trial court.
I

clear

!
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-I concur in the conclusion \
reached by Justice Carter.
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